The banking environment in Hong Kong: changing times for local banks. by Chau, Man Ming Amy. et al.
THE BANKING ENVIRONMENT IN HONG KONG： 
CHANGING TIMES FOR LOCAL BANKS 
by 
Chau Man Ming, Amy 
周 敏 明 • 
Wong Pik Ha�(Elsa) 
黃 碧 霞 -
M B A PROJECT REPORT 
Presented to 
The Graduate School 
In Partial Fulfilment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
Three-Year MBA Programme 
THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 
May 1995 
\ 






Name : Chau Man Ming, Amy 周每文明 
Wong Pik Ha, Elsa 黃碧霞 
Degree : Master of Business Administration 
Title : The Banking Environment in Hong Kong: 
Changing Times for Local Banks 
T DijfGeorge giK 




Licensed banks in Hong Kong can be divided into two broad categories: 
local-based banks and branches of foreign banks. Performance of local banks 
are hypersensitive to local economic cycle and more importantly, the political 
risks therein. Foreign banks, on the other hand, are less affected since they are 
only branches of their parent banks and are therefore much more flexible to 
local changes when compared to local banks. Hence, this paper will 
concentrate on local banks for discussion purposes and data and information 
collected through desk research or literature review are valid up to the second 
quarter of 1994 only. 
The changing operating environment for local banks in Hong Kong has 
limited the earnings growth of the banking sector. The critical changes in 
these environmental elements that are unique to Hong Kong and have most 
impact on local banks are discussed. These include: (i) cap on mortgage 
percentage as a means to curb escalating property prices; (ii) negative real 
interest rates leading to constrained funding; (iii) escalating rentals and 
expensive human resources; (iv) removal of interest rate cap on time deposits 
drives up the cost of funding; (v) narrower interest rate spreads due to fierce 
competition for funds both locally and internationally; (vi) doubtful outlook 
for investment in Hong Kong after 1997 due to on-going disputes between 
China and Britain. 
All these unfavourable environmental changes are already taking place 
and will continue to restrain local banks' profitability in the future years. 
iii 
Banks must therefore come up with new business strategies to overcome these 
obstacles in their operating environment. The two most common strategic 
alternatives are cost control and income expansion. For the banking sector, 
both are not easy routes. This paper will attempt to recommend some methods 
which can be adopted to achieve these objectives. 
For cost control，the key is to study the working efficiency of the branch 
network of local banks. Decisions have to be made to improve productivity, 
re-locate resources or even close down individual branches that are deemed 
inefficient. 
On the income expansion front, the worldwide trend is to concentrate 
on non~interest activities. Although net interest receipts are traditionally the 
key income source for banks, its importance has declined over the years due to 
keen competition as a result of global demand for funds. Thus it is much 
sensible to improve non-interest income such as service fees charged for 
management and consultancy services, arrangement of syndication loans, 
underwriting and brokerage services, premium personal banking services, etc. 
Although non-interest income will be the focus for future banking 
operations, this paper will also provide recommendations on how to improve 
the traditional interest income. These methods mainly deal with boosting the 
assets/liabilities size and increasing interest margin through maintaining the 
balance sheet in a better way. 
iv 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, Hong Kong's banking sector has effectively 
been transformed into a functional international financial 
centre where not only are financial transactions booked but actual operations 
are carried out. The wave of banking internationalisation came in the wake of 
\ 
China's open door policy which started in 1978. Internationalisation brought 
about several important changes in the domestic banking sector. 
First�there was an influx of foreign banks�especially when the Hong 
Kong Government lifted the moratorium on bank licensing in 1978. Since 
Hong Kong is an integrated financial centre with no delineation between 
offshore and domestic banking business�foreign banks could always intrude 
into the domestic market provided that they have been granted a bank licence. 
This has led to intense competition in the domestic market for banks in Hong 
Kong. 
In addition, as a result of China's open door policy, the competitive 
strategies of the Bank of China (BOC) Group was changed. Since 1979，this 
group of banks has gone from maintaining a highly conservative and stagnant 
position to taking a relatively aggressive and innovative one. Their move has 
also intensified competition in the Hong Kong banking market. 
In fact, the operating environment is constantly changing over the 
recent years. The banking sector has experienced its growth in the late 80s 
and early 90s. With the favourable environmental elements slowly 
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disappearing, it would be interesting to see how the industry will transform 
again to cope with these changes. But before jumping into such analyses, it is 
useful to take a closer look at some of the basic characteristics and operations 
of the local banking market. The purpose of this chapter will therefore aim at 
taking an overview of the development and structure of the Hong Kong 
banking system. 
Financial Institutions in Hon,9� Kong 
In Hong Kong, there exist various forms of financial institutions. They 
are mainly divided into the following types: 
1. Banking Institutions. These are the most traditional form of deposit-taking 
intermediary; 
a) Commercial banks 
b) Restricted licensed banks 
c) Deposit-taking companies 
2. Insurance Companies. These are close to the deposit-taking intermediary 
in that the claim offered to the policy holders is fixed by the contract 
(contingent on the occurrence of an event such as death in life insurance 
and fire damage in fire insurance). 
3. Mutual Fund Intermediaries. Investment house managing unit trusts, 
mutual funds，or pension funds are typical forms of mutual fund 
intermediaries. 
4. Brokerage Houses. These are for the dealing of stocks, foreign exchange, 
and commodities, and are also getting more poplar in Hong Kong. 
^BA Project May 1995 
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Categorising Banks in Hong Kong 
Banks in Hong Kong can be categorised in different ways which are: 
• By the legal banking structure 
• By the country of incorporation 
• By the country of ownership 
By the Legal Banking Structure 
The most common way of categorising banks in Hong Kong is by the 
legal banking structure. The banking structure in Hong Kong is a three-tier 
system which is formed by three types of institutions that are authorised to 
take deposits from the general public: (i) Licensed banks, (ii) Restricted 
Licensed Banks (RLBs), and (iii) Deposit-taking Companies (DTCs). 
Licensed banks provide normal banking services. They accept deposits 
of any maturity and size; grant loans and advances; discount trade bills and 
bankers acceptances; deal in gold, foreign exchange, and other securities; and 
provide business consultative services. 
Restricted licensed banks, on the other hand, are investment banks or 
merchant banks. They take deposits of large denominations, underwrite 
securities, deal in foreign exchange and other securities, and provide financial 
advisory services in issuance of securities and mergers and acquisitions. 
Deposit-taking companies are finance companies. Their services include 
taking deposits, granting loans to medium to small businesses, factoring, and 
leasing. 
MBA Project 
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By the Country of Incorporation 
Another most often used method is by the country of incorporation. 
Here it means banks are categorised according to the where they are 
incorporated. In Hong Kong, a large majority of banks were incorporated 
outside Hong Kong. Banks incorporated in Hong Kong only accounts for about 
one-fifth of the total number of banks. However, counting the number of 
banks by their location of incorporation may not be very meaningful. This is 
because of the active mergers and acquisitions in the banking'sector which 
can be traced back to the late 1960s. 
By the Country of Ownership 
A more meaningful way of categorising banks in Hong Kong would be 
by looking at the country of ownership. This means that banks can be 
distinguished by the nationality of their ownership (by majority share holding) 
or management. Until 1986, nonetheless, there were no official statistics on 
the number of banks by country of ownership. Both the analysts and the 
practitioners have categorised banks in Hong Kong into four groups. They are: 
1. the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Group，which includes 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and a local Chinese 
bank, the Hang Seng Bank; ‘ 
2. the Bank of China Group, which includes the 13 sister banks owned by 
China; 
the foreign banks; and 
4. the local Chinese banks 
MBA Project 
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Assets and Liabilities of Licensed Banks 
To examine the uses and sources of funds for banks, the most 
4-
convenient way is to take a look at the structure of their assets and liabilities. 
Assets 
On the asset side, there are a number of noteworthy points: 
1. Asset Item: Due From Banks Abroad. "Due from banks abroad��are 
deposits of banks in Hong Kong with overseas banks. This item was the 
largest asset item and it experienced rapid growth of nearly 100% since 
1980 when its share in total assets was only 26.57%. This demonstrates 
well the role of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Funds are 
channelled from and to countries outside of Hong Kong. Such transactions 
are generally carried out through the local and overseas banking system. 
2. Asset Item: Loans and Advances. "Loans and advances��is the second 
largest asset item. This includes various types of bank loans to individuals 
or business firms for various purposes. 
3. Asset Item: Due From Banks and DTCs. "Due from banks and DTCs" was 
the third largest item, but its share in total assets has gradually declined 
over the years. 
4. Other Asset Items. The holding of some of the liquid assets or marketable 
securities such as NCDs�bankers acceptances, floating-rate notes� 
commercial paper, treasury bills, and securities also enjoyed very rapid 
^ growth. However, their share in total assets is still of minimal significance. 
MBA Project 
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Liabilities 
Some of the features of bank liabilities are highlighted as below: 
1. Total Bank Liabilities. The total liabilities has been on an upward trend for 
the past decade. 
2. Liability Item: Due to Banks Abroad. The most important liability item in 
1989 is "due to banks abroad���which is the amount borrowed by banks in 
Hong Kong from banks outside Hong Kong. The trend over the past decade 
indicates that banks in Hong Kong were increasingly using overseas funds 
to finance their assets. 
3. Other Liability Items. The other important liability items were "customers' 
deposits" and “due to banks and DTCs in Hong Kong". The first item is just 
deposits from individuals and non-deposit-taking firms. Since Hong Kong 
is an integrated financial centre�there is no delineation between resident 
and non-resident banks and DTCs in Hong Kong. This item is usually 
referred to as “interbank borrowing". Since foreign banks lack a strong 
deposit base, it is very common for them to be net debtors in this market. 
Although both of these items experienced enviable growth rates, they still 
had to give way to overseas interbank borrowing. 
4. Liability Item: NCDs Outstanding. These are negotiable certificates of 
deposit issued by banks and not yet redeemed. Banks normally use these 
instruments as a tool for liability management. Over the past decade, 
NCDS enjoyed tremendous growth of over 35.3%, but because of their 
‘ small base�their share in total liabilities is still very low at around 1%. 
MBA Project 
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CHAPTER II 
THE BANKING SYSTEM 
M i r e than ever before in its history, Hong Kong's future 
conomic success depends on its ability to remain a leading 
centre for regional and international finance. The financial sector will 
ultimately shape the economic role Hong Kong is going to play in the next 
century. Banks are the major player in the financial market. Hence, it is 
essential that we understand the basics and the history of the banking system 
before studying in greater depth the changing environment and its 
implications and effect on the banking industry. 
The Market Structure 
"Market Structure" usually relates to the degree of competition in the 
market. When the market is more competitive, market shares tend to be quite 
evenly distributed among players. If the market share is highly concentrated 
and rest with a few companies, the market is generally referred as less 
competitive or more "concentrated". 
The economic implications, according to economic theories, are the 
more concentrated the market is, the less productive the market will be and 
the higher the prices will be. 
Banks�like all other commercial business operations, buy factors of 
production to produce products or assets. In the case of banks, the factors of 
production usually include various types of financial liabilities (e.g. customers' 
MBA Project 
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deposits and NCDs) and real resources (e.g. machines, computers, and human 
resources ( � and the products or assets are various types of financial assets (e.g. 
loans, NCDs, and floating rate notes) and other real services (e.g. cheque-
clearing, data processing, and financial consultancy services). 
Since in the banking business, the bulk of financial liabilities and assets 
should be deposits and loans, respectively, it is often predicted by economic 
theory that in a highly concentrated market, fewer loans and higher loan 
interest rates would result. Such an unusual spread between deposit rate and 
loan rate induced by a concentrated market would not be beneficial to 
depositors as well as borrowers. Hence, in some developed markets such as 
the United States�any merger or acquisition would not be approved by the 
government unless it could be proved that the degree of competitiveness would 
not be affected. Although there is no such law in the Hong Kong environment, 
it is in the interest of the general public to have some idea about the market 
structure of the Hong Kong banking market. 
Evolving to the Current Banking System 
The local banking system has the following characteristics which are 
worth taking note of: 
• The deposit market is relatively segmented and heavily dominated by the 
licensed banks. 
• In a society which is predominately Chinese, there are relatively few purely-
local Chinese banks. 
• It is highly internationalised. 
^BA Project May 1995 
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O The domestic market is rather oligopolistic, heavily dominated by several 
banking groups，namely the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, the Bank of China Group, and the Standard Chartered Bank. 
It is definitely not an easy task to find a simple and straightforward 
explanation for the evolution of such a system. The following sections only 
attempt to discuss the more basic reasons for the evolution. 
Exciting Economic Growth and Technological Advances 
In the 1970s，Hong Kong began to enjoy enviable economic growth. 
Although at a more moderate rate�such a trend of growth was sustained into 
the 1980s. With such a strong economy, it is not at all surprising that there 
was a rapid increase in the supply of deposits and the demand for loans. 
In addition, people began to use more banking services, for instance, 
they use more bank cheques to settle their transactions and they invest more in 
bank deposits as a means to accumulate their wealth. As a consequence, the 
demand for bank intermediation has been increasing at a promising rate. On 
the other hand, the banking system has adopted various types of advance 
technology such as automated teller machines and electrohic and phone 
banking, to increase the cost-effectiveness and hence the supply of 
intermediation services. 
In the 1980s，there were some fundamental changes in the economic 
environment that led to the new role of Hong Kong as a financial centre. First, 
the economic reform of China began to take off, and China changed its 
^BA Project May 1995 
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attitude toward borrowing from abroad. Hong Kong then became one of the 
major centres for lending to China. 
Second, the rising trade deficit and fiscal deficit of the United States 
made it a net recipient of funds and made some of the countries in Asia, 
notably Japan and Taiwan, net supplies of funds. These fundamental changes 
in the economic and financial environment made the intermediation banking 
activities of Hong Kong much more important than ever before. 
Government Policies 
Apart market competition, government policies'also have a part to play 
in determining the predominant role of the licensed banks in the deposit 
market. From 1966 to 1978，the Government imposed a moratorium on new 
bank licensing. Foreign financial institutions then wishing to get a foothold in 
Hong Kong could not incorporate themselves as commercial banks but had to 
form establishments such as merchant banks or investment banks. At that 
time, some local firms also set up finance companies to lend money to people 
investing in the securities market and property market, or to companies doing 
relatively high-risk business. As these types of institutions were not governed 
by any form of regulation, their number quickly increased to about 2,000 in 
the early 1970s. . 
The Government felt that they need to do something and thus 
introduced the Deposit-taking Companies (DTCs) Ordinance, which required 
DTCs to have a minimum paid-up capital of HK$ 2.5 million. These DTCs 
were not allowed to accept deposits of less than HK$ 50,000 for any one 
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account. Nevertheless, since these institutions were not controlled by the 
interest rate agreement, they could still compete effectively for deposits by 
offering interest rates higher than licensed banks. As a result, their share in 
the deposit market had reached almost 30% in 1980. 
With a view to having better control over the interest rate and provide 
better protection for depositors, the Government then had to establish the 
three-tier system, which, in effect, precluded DTCs from accepting short-term 
deposits, and also enabled banks to recapture their lost market share. 
The Banking Crisis 
The evolution of the oligopolistic nature of the banking system, that is, a “ 
few banking groups dominating the whole domestic banking market, can also 
be traced back to the banking crises of the 1960s. In 1961, the first grave 
bank run occurred on the Liu Chong Hing Bank. A joint support programme, 
announced by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the 
Standard Chartered Bank, later managed to stop the run. 
What is more important in the history of development and evolution of 
the banking system was a more serious banking crisis occurred in 1965. In 
that year, a small, sole proprietorship bank, the Ming Tak Bank, and a 
medium-sized bank, the Canton Trust and Commercial Bank Limited 
collapsed. The worst part of it was panic quickly spread to other local banks. 
They immediately faced runs by depositors too. 
In order to restore depositors' confidence and trust in local banks, the 
largest and the most successful local Chinese bank, the Hang Seng Bank, was 
^BA Project May 1995 
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then acquired by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. On the 
other hand�other smaller local Chinese banks also sought an injection of 
foreign capital in order to maintain depositors' confidence. Since no new bank 
licence was being granted during that time，foreign banks were also more than 
willing to acquire local Chinese banks and tried to get a foothold in the 
banking market in Hong Kong. 
Another major crisis occurred from 1982 to 1986. As a result of the 
crisis, several DTCs collapsed and the Government had to take over three 
banks including the Hang Lung Bank, the Overseas Trust Bank�and the Hong 
Kong Industrial and Commercial Bank. “Lifeboat��types funds were also 
provided to several other problem banks which include the Ka Wah Bank, the 
Union Bank，the Wing On Bank, and the Hon Nin Bank. Later, these banks 
were acquired by other corporations from China, the United States as well as 
� 
local corporations. Thus, after all these crises, only a handful of purely 
Chinese banks remained. 
According to the financial experts, there are three major reasons for 
these crises: 
O There was a general economic recession，a political crisis，and a rapid fall 
in property prices and the Hong Kong dollar exchange rate stemming 
therefrom. 
• Excessive management or even fraud was committed by directors or 
managers of banks or DTCs. 
• The banking regulations at that time were too loose and inadequate to 
handle a banking system that was expanding at such a rapid pace. Some of 
^BA Project May 1995 
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the Government officials were also seen as not well equipped to supervise 
banks and DTCs. 
Central Banking in Hong Kong 
The principal objective of a central bank, or equivalent monetary 
authority, is to control supply of money. Control over the money supply is 
needed to prevent inflation and to provide for efficiency in the exchange of 
goods in a market economy. 
Basically central banks have four means of controlling money: 
• Changes in Required Reserve Ratios. Banks and otHer financial institutions 
that issue cheque deposit money must have an account with the central 
bank. The funds in this account must be kept at some minimum ratio of 
the bank's outstanding deposit liabilities，say 10%. An administered 
increase in this ratio reduces the ability of a bank to make loans and create 
money on the basis of any given volume of reserves on deposit with the 
central bank. A reduction in the required reserve ratio encourages banks 
to lend and create more deposit money. 
。Changes in Loan Interest Ratio. A central bank can lend reserve funds to a 
bank. Such loans enable the bank, in turn, to expand loans to its 
, customers, creating deposit money in the process. Thus, by reducing the 
interest rate charged on loans to banks, the central bank can encourage 
borrowing and money creation. When the central bank raises the interest 
cost to banks, it discourages bank lending and money creation. 
舰 P—ct May 1 的5 
Changing Times for Local Banks ‘ 14 
• Changes in the Volume of Bank Reserves. A central bank can buy an item, 
usually a financial security of some type，in the marketplace. The seller of 
the security is given a cheque on the central bank. To collect the cheque, 
the seller must deposit it in a bank. The bank then sends the cheque to the 
central bank, where the individual bank's reserve account is increased by 
the amount of the cheque. With larger bank reserves available to meet 
serve requirements, banks can lend and create money. When a central 
bank buys something in the open market, bank reserves are increased and 
money expansion is possible. On the contrary, when it sells something 
bank reserves fall. Such activities are known as "open market operations". 
• Moral Suasion. A central bank may simply tell managers of banks to limit 
their deposit creation to certain amounts. Banks must respond if they are 
to remain in the good graces of the Government. It is always assumed that 
the Government will act in the interests of the people and the economy. 
In Hong Kong, however, the Government does not have a central bank. 
The basic functions of a central bank in controlling money supply and setting 
up monetary policies were being handled by the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA). It may, for instance, enter the interbank borrowing 
market to stabilise interest rates. 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation�on the other hand, 
virtually acts as the central bank of Hong Kong and has taken up the other 
functions of a typical central bank. It is therefore often referred to as a Quasi-
Central Bank for Hong Kong. In this position, Hongkong Bank, has been 
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enjoying a lot of quasi-central banking privileges which creates many 
controversies in the market. Among the most controversial is its role as the 
Management Bank of the Hong Kong Clearing House of the HKAB. 
After reviewing the basics and history of the banking system in Hong 
Kong, we can then move into analysing the local banking environment. 
i, 
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CHAPTER III 
THE HEYDAY 
Since February 1994, Hong Kong has followed the 
US in increasing the interest rates that resulted in 
narrower interest rate spreads.... directly affects profit of 
local banks.... industry believes 1995 will continue to be 
a difficult year.... i 
1 ^ ates are up, markets are down. It is only predictable that the 
X X b a n k i n g environment, particularly for local banks, would seem 
pretty inhospitable and would probably remain so for the next few years. The 
banking sector has underperformed the Hang Seng Index since the beginning 
of 1994 (Chart 1). There were concerns that earnings growth has already 
peaked in 1993 and forecasts that local banks would be unable to repeat the 
30% plus growth rates. 
Chart 1: Relative performance of Finance Sub-
Index to Hang Seng Index (9/93-8/94) 
110 1 
—HSF 
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Source: Bloomberg 
1 “The Investment Angle", Hong Kong Economic Times (13 March 1995) 
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1994 interim profit growth in the banking sector has subsequently 
indicated that banks were evidently under the pressure of rapidly changing 
operating environment. The widely held belief was that interest rate de-
regulation and rising interest rates may erode net interest margins. However, 
the markedly slow growth rates on the medium to larger banks - between 17 
to 21% ~ were not just an effect of narrowing of spreads. It was indeed a 
result of the combination of various environmental changes which are unique 
to Hong Kong. . 
The Bankers�Paradise 
The banking sector in Hong Kong has been the "bankers' paradise" for 
the last few years. All the unimaginable ingredients for an earnings boom 
were in place. Interest rates fell rapidly between mid-1991 to mid-1992, 
more as a result of the US$ peg than local economic need. Although inflation 
in Hong Kong is obstinately on the high side (and will undoubtedly remain so 
due to labour and land constraints), deposit rates cannot climb much above 
those of the US without jeopardising the "peg" by putting the system under 
immediate pressure. Adding to this are the other favourable factors which 
fostered the "banking heaven" environment in Hong Kong, 
a Hong Kong property values have risen more than five times since 1986, 
driven by speculation through high income growth. This created a surge 
in mortgage loan demand. Unrestrained credit expansion in 1988 allowed 
HK$ loan to grow at a tremendous pace at 30% p.a. 
K 
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• Lending/deposit spreads widened (Chart 2) as the Hong Kong Banking 
Association (HKAB) let deposit rates fall ahead of the prime in July 1991 
due to "peg" pressure. Spreads widened again in September 1991 as 
"mark-up" over prime for new residential mortgages widened from 1.25% 
to 1.75% in the first attempt to quell a surging property market. 
% Chart 2: Prime "base" and mortgage lending 
� spreads 
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• Loan growth was surpassing that of deposits, and the HK$ loan/deposit 
ratio for licensed banks as a whole was on the rise (Charts 3 & 4). 
Chart 3: HK loan & deposit Chart 4: HK$ loan/deposit ratio 
(adjusted for swaps) growth (%) (licensed banks, adjusted for 
o/o (licensed banks), YOY % o,� swaps) 
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Source: Standard Chartered Securities source: Standani Charter^ Securities 
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O Real savings (and lending) rates (Charts 5 & G) fell into negative territory 
since 1990. It therefore made good sense to borrow money when you are 
effectively paid to do so. 
Chart 5: Negative real savings Chart 6: Negative real prime 
rate (%) lending rate {%) 
% % 
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As can be seen in Chart 7，banking share prices rapidly began to react 
to improving fundamentals in early 1991. 
Chart 7: Relative performance of Finance Sub-
Index to Hang Seng Index (1987-1993) 
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Turn of The. Cycle , 
Having enjoyed favourable spreads and strong loan growth, in 1992， 
the local banks are now faced with a severe challenge brought about by the 
changing environment. 
• With the imposition of mortgage percentage restrictions and the drop in 
re-exports�mortgage lending and trade financing, the traditional "cash 
cows��for the banking sector, will see sluggish growth. 
• As a result of the sharply negative real interest rates and uncompetitive 
yields against other forms of investment, funding will be constrained which 
in turn will limit loan growth. 
• Operating costs for banks have been on a rising trend due to escalating 
office rentals and expensive human resources. 
• Since the Hong Kong government has accepted the recommendations of the 
Consumer Council on interest rate agreement, the cost of funds is driven 
up due to competition for deposits. 
• When competition for deposits heats up，interest rate spreads will become 
much narrower than they were before. 
• Due to the economic recovery in US�European countries, Japan and also 
vast development in some emerging economies, the need for funds drives 
up the global interest rate led by the US interest rates. This will become 
another tight constraint for the already tight liquidity money market. 
^BA Project May 1995 
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• The outlook for investment in Hong Kong has been cast in doubt. The on-
going negotiations and disputes between China and Britain may have 
effects on investment environments in Hong Kong after 1997. ‘ 
� 
^BA Project May 1995 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
y I ihe traditional role of commercial banking concentrates on 
JL deposit-taking and lending among individuals and institutions -
conducting financial intermediation. Yet the importance of direct finance has 
been heightened with the liberalisation of the global capital market in recent 
years. Commercial banks in the US�Western Europe and even Japan have now 
increasingly engaged in diverse non-interest income activities. 
In Hong Kong, though net interest income continues to be the main 
source of bank earnings�accounting for almost 70% of total income (Table 1), 
the changing domestic financial environment limits the earning power of local 
banks. 
Table 1 : Interest and non-interest income of all authorised Institutions 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
(1)NIR 22.11 (12.4) 29.12 (31.7) 42.66 (46.5) 52.06 (22.1) 60.39 (16.0) 
(2) Nil 15.92 (-0.2) 17.49 (9.8) 19.52 (11.6) 23.09 (18.3) 28.22* (22.2)* 
FC 6.79 (18.8) 7.7 (13.5) 8.64 (12.2) 10.33 (19.5) 12.70 (23.0) 
Others® 9.14 (-10.8) 9.79 (7.1) 10.87 (11.1) 12.76 (17.4) 15.50' (21.6)* 
(3)TI 38.10 (6.8) 46.60 (22.5) 62.20 (33.4) 75.20 (20.9) 88.60* ( 1 7 . 9 � 
Unit: HKD Billion 
Figures in brackets denote year-on~yearpercentage changes 
NIR denotes net interest receipts 
Nil denotes total non-interest income 
FC denotes fees & commissions 
Others denotes other non-interest income 
TI denotes total income 
@ denotes other non-interest income including profits from foreign exchange and securities trading 
* denotes BEA Economic Research estimates 
Source: BEA Economic Analysis 1994 
‘ Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics 
Hong Kong Monetary A uthority Annual Report 1993 
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Most of the listed banking corporations have already announced 1994 
interim results. As seen from these financial reports, the profit growth has 
evidently slowed down compared to the last few years. It has been widely 
publicised that earnings growth in the banking sector has begun to come 
under pressure. This is a cumulative effect of various environmental changes 
that are critical to the operation of local banks in Hong Kong. 
Loan Growth on a Tightrope , 
Because of the wide spreads provided by HK$ lending and the 
assumption that the vast majority of local banks' foreign currency lending is 
US$ based trade finance�the most important categories of lending for local 
banks are, namely mortgage loans and trade finance. 
Loose control on credit expansion in 1988 with the surge in mortgage 
loan demand resulted in a phenomenon where HK$ deposits are being 
outgrown by loans to a great extent. Consequently HK$ loan to deposit ratio 
soon exceeded 100% in 1989，and has fluctuated between 108-118% ever 
since (Chart 4). The funding gap has largely been met by the recycling of 
offshore HK$ liabilities into the interbank market, and from foreign currency 
borrowings abroad. As these alternatives carry higher interest rates, the 
resultant effect was the increase in the average cost of funding. A high loan to 
deposit ratio has meant that credit growth can only move in tandem with the 
rate of deposit growth, to ensure credit risks are kept in check. 
應 Project Afe/1995 
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Mortgage Loan Percentage Capped 
As one of the key components of banks�loan market, mortgage loans 
have always contributed significantly to the profit growth of the banking 
sector. Although the banks' mortgage loan growth was curbed by the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority's (HKMA) regulatory pressure to minimise exposure 
to the property sector，mortgage loans still account for a significant portion of 
their loan book. 
Total residential mortgage lending has grown rapidly in the last few 
years as a result of the negative interest rate environment. Its share of total 
loans for use in Hong Kong has climbed from 15.5% at the end of 1987 to 
22.5% as of the end of September 1993. This growth has been a major 
contributor to the widening of overall interest rate spreads due to the relatively 
high rates charged. However, the property market has still prospered and 
property price in Hong Kong has risen at a frightening pace since 1986. With 
values outpacing affordability, the risk of large scale correction is apparently 
higher. 
As anticipated, the introduction of measures by the Government to curb 
escalating property prices has seen sales activities in all sectors of the property 
market decline quite significantly in 1994. In particular, the mass residential 
market has seen prices soften by between 20-30% although price levels at the 
top end of the market have remained fairly stable. The market reached its 
peak during March 1994 and prices have fallen steadily since then. The 
imposition of additional mortgage lending restrictions by the banks has further 
added to the slowdown. 
^BA Project May 1995 
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Moreover, most banks have voluntarily lowered the percentage of 
lending on property worth more than HK$ 5 million to 50% of value, against 
70% industry bench mark. Even though some have released this mortgage 
restriction on luxury property in the beginning of 1995, most are still very 
cautious and are lending only to valued customers. Hongkong Bank and Hang 
Seng Bank went further to impose stringent policies relating to mortgage 
refinancing and eligibility requirements of borrowers which effectively made 
borrowing on mortgages much more difficult. 
After the mortgage ceiling was lowered in November 1991，mortgage 
loan growth slowed to 14% yoy in the fourth quarter of 1992，against 35% 
yoy growth in the fourth quarter of 1991. However, a swell in demand in 
1993 has driven prices up again, particularly on the luxury end of the market 
by a maximum of 30%. Mortgage loans growth jumped by HK$ 12 billion in 
just one quarter (second quarter in 1993) with a 12% yoy increase. 
In view of the projected demand for mortgages (Chart 8)，banks cannot 
meet loan demands without increasing their risks, as funding growth cannot 
keep pace. Based on compound annual growth rate of 16% for 1993 and 
1994 on HK$ deposits, banks' exposure to mortgage loans will increase from 
29% in 1993 to 36% by 1994 if mortgage lending is not restrained. 
However, banks are unlikely to relax their policy towards mortgage 
lending, as they are striving to shift the balance of risk on their loan books. 
Unless deposit growth picks up dramatically, the impact of tighter loan policies 
is eicpected to last well into 1995，when the bottleneck of deferred mortgages 
is eased and volume of property supply growth slows to 6% in 1995. The 
MBA Project 
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impact on banks' profitability will be significant, as wide margins (mortgage 
loan rate - deposit rate « 5%) generated from 38% of an average bank's loan 
book will be hard to compensate in other areas. 
Chart 8: Estimated mortgage loan growth 
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Trade Finance on a Downtrend 
The second important component of the banks' loan book is trade 
finance. Historically, trade finance growth has very much tracked growth in 
total trade and correlates most with re-export trade growth. Banks have put 
more emphasis on trade loans as "preferred" due to their relatively short-term 
nature. Since the beginning of 1992, total re-exports trade in Hong Kong has 
been on a downtrend (Chart 9) primarily because of slow economic growth in 
major trading countries. The expansion of China's economy in the same 
period did not reverse the growth trend. Also noteworthy is that the 1989 
trade decline was not just a result of an economic contraction in China, but 
also the rest of the world. US related total re-export growth plunged to 22% 
MBA Project 
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from 42% in 1989. Although it is understood that re-exports with China form 
the largest component of Hong Kong's trade - 30 to 33% since 1988，these two 
events illustrate that external factors outside China may have a larger effect on 
re-exports. 
Chart 9: Trade finance growth vs re-export growth 
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The likely effect of China's credit contractionary policies will have the 
most impact on lending on retained re-exports: raw materials and finished 
‘ g o o d s for consumption within China's domestic market. This constitutes 15% 
of the total re-exports. Nonetheless, the expected contraction in China's 
industrial production is said to have little effect on trade finance growth. This 
is because the banks�loan book exposure toward lending to state enterprises is 
usually fairly limited. Joint venture production is mostly funded by non-PRC 
partners (PRC partners provide the land and labour) therefore the effect of the 
credit squeeze should also be limited. 
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Funding Constrained 
Constrained by the “peg� � �the local banking sector faces an increasing 
difficulty in funding growth. Interest rates could not be used as an instrument 
for restraining high inflation，resulting in real interest return plunging to -4% 
since the beginning of 1991. Ever since the interest rate cuts in 1992 which 
were needed to follow the US interest rate reduction due to the peg, bank 
savings has become an unattractive form of investment (Chart 2). Although 
growth in total HK$ deposits rose slightly from 9.8% in May 1994 to 10.7% in 
July 1994 due to the upward revision of local interest rates in May, bank 
savings are still not a preferred investment. Against a benchmark of three 
month deposits as average cost of funding, the existing yield of 5% in retail 
deposits fall below returns on alternative forms of investments such as rentals, 
which sometimes may yield 7-8%. As a result，liquidity was attracted into 
other forms of investment stocks, property, etc. 
Escalating Costs Getting Out of Control 
In general, operating costs for business in Hong Kong are rising fast in 
terms of high office rentals and expensive human resources. Rising costs, 
although prevalent for the last few years, have never been at the top of the 
• 、 
agenda for banks. This is because revenues were always growing at a much 
faster pace than costs. 
In 1994, however, cost controls seemed to have become the industry's 
buzz'word suddenly. This issue is becoming one of the key concerns for bank 
managers nowadays. Wages generally make up 60% of total operating costs 
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for banks while rents and others accounts for the rest. It is estimated that 
wage growth would be around 12% p.a. This rate of increase will be 
marginally higher than inflation in 1994. On the other hand, prime retail 
rents are rising at a rate of 30-50% p.a. History shows that a rapid build-up in 
costs and assets during an economic upturn can backfire, usually in a nasty 
manner, when an economic slowdown occurs. 
Labour Costs on the High Side 
Human resources have become increasingly expensive in Hong Kong 
over the past years. When compared with other Asian countries except Japan, 
wages are on the high side. As Hong Kong plays a very significant role in the 
vast economic development of Mainland China, its unemployment has been 
kept to as low as 2% for most of the time in 1990s. Due to this labour 
shortage, employers are unable to hire sufficient labour to provide up-to-
standard service quality in a lot of cases. Sometimes they may even have to 
hire staff who do not necessarily meet all their employment requirements. As 
a consequence, service quality is deteriorating. 
Office Rentals Going Up 
Rental levels in all areas on Hong Kong Island have continued to record 
steady increases, although towards the end of the second quarter in 1994，a 
slowdown became apparent as the pace of these increases declined quite 
noticeably. Average net effective rentals in Central are still at a record high of 
HK$‘81 per sq. ft, an increase of approximately 19% quarter-on-quarter 
during the second quarter in 1994. Asking rentals in Exchange Square are 
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around HK$ 120 per sq. ft. for small units，with rentals in the Bank of China at 
HK$ 85 per sq. ft. and HK$ 90 per sq. ft. in the Landmark (rental figures 
collected for the second quarter in 1994). ‘ 
The 30-50% increase in prime rent levels on those branches that face 
lease renewal in the coming year could be crippling. To determine the 
sensitivity of banks toward changes in rentals，the level of branch ownership is 
examined. The level of branch ownership is usually viewed as a percent of the 
network. An analysis of some local bank operations (Table 2) shows that, for 
instance, Dah Sing Bank owns a low percentage of its branch network (only 
50%), making it relatively sensitive to step-up rental increases. 
Table 2: Branch ownership ratio 
% owned No of Branches 
Bank of East Asia 92 79 
Wing Hang Bank 90 22 
Wing Lung Bank 89 28 
Dao Heng Bank 81 89 
HK Chinese Bank 75 24 
Hang Seng Bank 67 126 
International Bank of Asia 60 22 
Dah Sing Bank 50 54 
Hongkong Bank 24 232 
Source: Credit Lyonimis Securities Asia 1994 ‘ 
Consumer Council Calls for Abolition of IRA 
The Interest Rate Agreement (IRA) was first imposed by the Hong Kong 
Association of Banks (HKAB) in 1964 as a result of the destructive competition 
in the banking sector in Hong Kong. At that time, many small banks and those 
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financial institutions without strong financial support were forced to close 
down due to the intense competition and the price war on interest rates in an 
attempt to attract more customers. 
There is no doubt that IRA is a policy which enables banks, as a unitary 
body, to monopolise the market. All interest rates for retail deposits i.e. less 
than HK$ 500,000 are standardised by the HKAB in their weekly meeting. The 
process takes place without any participation from the depositors or 
customers. IRA also demands all banks to offer the same level of interest rates 
to their customers. No member of the HKAB is allowed to compete against 
each other in this respect. In other words，interest rates in Hong Kong are not 
determined by market forces but by the HKAB. This arrangement is in effect a 
kind of monopoly. 
However, with the Consumer Council's recommendations to abolish 
such a practice to stop banks from reaping excessive profits by setting interest 
rates at artificially low levels, the good days for the banking sector are going. 
Since the Hong Kong government has accepted the recommendations of 
Consumer Council，and will remove the interest rate cap on time deposits 
below $500,000 before 1995，the cost of funding for banks would jet up. This 
would mean a further erosion into the net interest income of banks. 
Competition Heatin,^ Up 
Wholesale deposits i.e. those in excess of the $500,000 with maturity 
less than 3 months�however, have always been open to "competitive bidding". 
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Obviously, those banks which lack a branch system to gather deposits are 
forced to pay more, in the form of higher rates，for Hong Kong dollar deposits. 
Hence, slow funding growth during the past year has led to fierce 
competition amongst banks for deposits, even though the more important 
cartel rate�the savings rate, remained untouched and is set to stay in place 
until 1997. 
Deposit growth in Hong Kong bottomed at 9% in 1992. Since then, the 
banking sector's funding position has started to improve but at a painstakingly 
slow pace. Smaller banks whose deposit base is biased toward corporate 
customers, are now willing to forsake margins for a slice of the funding pie. 
The amount of three- to ten-year commercial paper issued in the 
second half of 1993 has also reached an all time high, at HK$ 2 billion, as 
American and local banks pay 5-7% return per annum to ensure a source of 
longer term deposit. On retail accounts, deposits over one year are offered a 
return of around 5%, thereby pulling the yield gap between savings in the 
bank and other forms of investments closer. 
Interest Rate Spreads Narrowing 
The fierce competition in the banking sector has resulted in narrower 
interest rate spreads for the industry. Measured by the spread between prime 
and three month deposit rate, interest margins in the first half of 1993 have 
narrowed by an average 100 basis points. This was because prime based 
returns dropped by a larger measure of 200 basis points than the cost of 
funding (73 basis points). 
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The falling interbank rate also had a diminishing effect on the return on 
shareholders funds on highly liquid banks such as Hang Seng. Larger banks, 
such as Hongkong Bank, which still has 57% of the total deposits in Hong 
Kong, will not forsake margins to compete for deposits, principally because of 
less flexibility in their Treasury operations and dominance in the retail market. 
However, lending spreads will come down�as returns on lending fall due to a 
changing loan portfolio mix. 
Bigger banks will also lose out gradually to the smaller foreign banks on 
deposits growth. Their trend of low single digit growth experienced in 1992 is 
set to continue. Smaller banks, will achieve higher deposit growth, at 15-20%, 
but interest cost will be higher which may have an impact on spreads. 
Importantly, "base" spreads in the interbank market have begun to firm 
up. With deposit rates low in the last year, loan/deposit ratios have tended to 
expand. In addition, interbank rates have been moving upwards in response 
to increasing demand. This has put tremendous pressure on many banks to 
find deposits to fund loans. The current pressure on spreads stems from the 
fact that some banks are now in a position of having to offer premiums to the 
wholesale deposit and interbank markets in order to attract deposits. 
Need for Funds Drives up Global Interest Rates 
Hong Kong is considered as one of the emerging markets. These so-
called "emerging markets” are usually greatly affected by the international 
fund flow. As some developed markets, such as the US�Japan and some 
European countries are now on their way to economic recovery, it is 
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anticipated that their funds in Hong Kong is bound to flow back to their home 
countries. Moreover, other emerging markets, such as Thailand, Indonesia 
and Brazil, etc are also experiencing vast developments. ” 
All these economic activities will mean that the need for funds in these 
economies will drive up the global interest rate. Interest rates in Hong Kong 
will therefore be pulled up to cope with the worldwide trend. This will 
become yet another constraint for the already tense liquidity money market. 
In other words�interest margins will be further abraded. . 
Shadow Cast on Investment Outlook for Hong Kong 
As Hong Kong is approaching 1997，the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) has 
been holding meetings and working hard on resolving various critical issues 
concerning the hand>over. These issues include the Eighth and Ninth 
Container Terminal, the infamous Airport project and the legal system etc. A 
lot of talks have been going on. Nonetheless, the progress is not much 
encouraging. There have been quite a number of disputes between China and 
Britain over many issues and policies. This may have unfavourable effect on 
the investment environment in Hong Kong after 1997. Investors may view 
Hong Kong's future with a sceptical attitude. 
Contrary to popular belief�most banks may not benefit directly from 
infrastructure spending in Hong Kong. Local banks do expect, however, to 
take part in financing the secondary and tertiary businesses supporting the 
major contracts at the airport and its related projects. It was estimated that 
these projects should bring a welcome boost to syndicated loans growth. HK$ 
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128 billion of projects has still be to awarded by the JLG�of which two-third 
will be privately funded. A rough estimate calls for HK$ 32 billion p.a. to be 
funded for the next years. The multiplier effect - it will spill-over to higher 
trade finance loans, through imports of capital machinery, and higher private 
consumption - is unquantifiable. 
Nevertheless, all this high hope may not be realised. Firstly, the 
outcome of on-going negotiations between China and Britain may not 
necessarily be positive. The effect on the economy and, in turn, .the banking 
sector has yet to be seen. 
Secondly, local banks may not benefit directly from these infrastructure 
projects. This is because for primary credit demands, competition will be very 
keen, as most new entrants to the financial sector in Hong Kong have been 
attracted by the huge infrastructure funding needs. US investment banks are 
vying for the large debt issues, and pricing is expected to be competitive on a 
global scale. 
Adding to the political uncertainty, there is also a concern of whether 
the pegged rate system of HK$ to US$ will be maintained after 1997. The 
Hong Kong dollar has for the last ten years been fixed to the US dollar at about 
US$1=HK$7.8. The prospect of the peg being broken is not an altogether 
pleasant one but, in investment terms, it is a still a possibility, particularly 
when the style of the Chinese government is so visibly different from the Hong 
Kong/British government. 
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CHAPTER V 
LIFTING UP BANK EARNINGS GROWTH AGAIN 
4-
I n Hong Kong, total net interest receipts of all authorised institutions 
grew by 16.0% to HK$ 60.39 billion in 1993, steadily down from an 
annual growth of 46.5% in 1991 (Table 1). The decline in interest margins, 
the financial disintermediation, the shrinkage in property loan growth and 
tighter banking supervision as discussed in Chapter II，all contributed to the 
slowdown in net interest income. 
To maintain their earning capacity and improve their financial position, 
local banks are attempting to go two non-exclusive routes, namely cost control 
and income expansion. Cost control has to deal with the two major elements 
of operating costs - land and labour. On the other side of the equation, banks 
have to adjust their business strategies and shift more emphasis onto more 
diverse non-interest income activities. This is exactly what is now happening 
as an inevitable trend in other developed countries. 
Tighter Cost Control to Improve Operating Efficiencies 
Branch networks are local commercial banks' biggest competitive edge 
over their international rivals. As the cost of operating these branches 
becomes increasingly expensive, the efficiency of using these networks is 
crucial to a bank's profit and asset growth. Local banks will have to formulate 
new strategies to improve the operating efficiencies of their branches. In 
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worse cases, branches with low operating efficiency may have to be closed 
down in order to maintain the overall efficiency for the network. 
To understand the operating network efficiencies, one has to look at 
various ratios. Based on publicly available information and some research 
estimates, the following table compares the assets/branch ratio, loans/branch 
ratio and deposits/branch ratio for some local banks (Tables 3 � 4 & 5). For easy 
comparison, they are ranked from the most to the least efficient in the tables. 
Comparing Assets/Branch Ratio 
It is not a bit surprising that Hongkong Bank and Hang Seng Bank� 
being the largest banks in Hong Kong, have the highest assets per branch 
value. The low growth at a mere 7-8% in 1993 over the previous year 
indicates that their economies of scale are relatively large when compared 
with other smaller banks. Significant improvement is therefore not easy at all 
unless through acquisitions and mergers. 
On the other hand, however, for other smaller to medium banks, they 
have enjoyed greater incremental gains over the past year. This is because 
they have a much smaller base to begin with. It is therefore expectedly easier 
for them to achieve more exciting growth rates which in turn means improved 
network efficiencies. . 
In 1993，HK Chinese Bank performed the best in terms of growth rate.‘ 
Its assets per branch ratio has been growing by over 75% year-on-year in 
FY93. This is resulted from their rapid assets expansion. Dah Sing has also 
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increased its assets per branch by a handsome 49% through acquisition of 
Wing On Bank in early 1993. 
Table 3: Assets/Branch (HK$m) 
92 93 94E 95E 96E 
Hongkong Bank 4,275 4,581 4,471 4,954 5,443 
Hang Seng Bank 2,059 2,216 2,363 2,531 2,735 
Wing Lung Bank 870 1,043 1,158 1,333 1,482 
Wing Hang Bank 904 1,039 1,130 1,242 1,373 
Bank of East Asia 827 905 1,040 1,189 1,357 
HK Chinese Bank 353 619 617 641 664 
International Bank of Asia 429 581 651 758 876 
Dah Sing Bank 291 434 494 585 697 
Dao Heng Bank 294 379 729 855 1,004 
Source: Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 1994 
Comparing Loans/Branch Ratio 
Similar to the above comparison, Hongkong Bank and Hang Seng Bank 
top the list again as one would expect. Amongst local banks, Hang Seng will 
probably generate more loans out of each branch in 1994 and 1995, showing 
a growth rate of 20% p.a., due to the change of its lending attitude. 
Table 4: Loans/Branch ( H K $ m ) . 
92 93 94E 95E 96E 
Hongkong Bank 1,857 2,067 2,004 2,240 2,483 
Hang Seng Bank 658 757 918 1,105 1,354 
Wing Hang Bank 474 558 629 713 812 
Wmg Lung Bank 344 491 551 647 738 
Bank of East Asia 402 466 538 619 710 
International Bank of Asia 266 347 395 465 544 
HK Chinese Bank 141 278 285 308 333 
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Dah Sing Bank 142 232 279 331 390 
Dao Heng Bank 131 177 403 478 567 
Source: Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 1994 
Comparing Deposits/Branch Ratio 
When the deposits/branch ratios are compared, Dao Heng Bank has 
seen successful attraction of additional deposits by marketing its enlarged 
branch network more effectively. Since the liquidity position in the banking 
sector tends to remain pretty tight in 1994 and 1995, the efficient use of a 
bank's branch network to collect cheaper customers' deposits will become the 
' key to a bank's success over the next 18 months into 1995. 
Table 5: Deposits/Branch (HK$m) 
92 93 94E 95E 96E 
Hongkong Bank 3,639 3,925 3,924 4,271 4,651 
Hang Seng Bank 1,737 1,855 1,976 2,121 2,287 
Wing Lung Bank 811 974 1,080 1,242 1,379 
Wing Hang Bank 807 909 989 1,088 1,204 
Bank of East Asia 758 829 946 1,080 1,229 
HK Chinese Bank 292 507 507 537 564 
International Bank of Asia 321 465 533 632 741 
Dah Sing Bank 245 376 427 508 607 
Dao Heng Bank 265 336 652 767 903 
Source: Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 1994 • 
Bettering Productivity 
The three ratios discussed in the previous sections will only give branch 
efficiency at a macro level. To be able to formulate system strategies to 
improve individual branch efficiency, bank managers would need to carry out 
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a review on productivity of individual branch in the network. This review will 
have to cover operational aspects within banks such as branch, loans, 
settlement and credit operations, etc. ‘. 
There are two basic methods of productivity review, namely Methods 
Study and Work Measurement. The former aims at studying operational 
procedures with a view to streamlining operational procedures to improve 
work efficiency. The latter, on the other hand，will try to quantify workload of 
each operational department and branch. 
With the review results, the following strategic alternatives may be 
considered: 
• Bank managers can work out the optimum staffing level for departments or 
branches. This can be achieved through voluntary lay-off and re-
deployment of staff. 
• They can also try to identify opportunities for merging branches or 
departments, closing down certain inefficient branches, selling assets to 
boost profits, and relocating operation centres to cheaper offices to reduce 
rental costs. 
• Lastly, they can also consider importing cheaper labour to handle relatively 
unskilled functions such as tellers, clerks and messengers, etc. 
Almost Impossible to Improve Interest Income ‘ 
To improve interest income�which is the traditional technique of 
commercial banks to expand earnings, becomes more and more difficult with 
the unfavourable changes in the operating environment for local banks in 
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Hong Kong. Having said that, however, there are still some strategies banks 
may adopt to improve net interest income. The primary objectives are to boost 
the assets/liabilities size and increase interest margins through better 
maintenance of the bank's balance sheet. 
Improve Yield Spread of Assets 
Most local banks usually keep a large amount of cash and money 
market placement as assets in order to produce a more liquid balance sheet 
which is required by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). This has 
been a common practice for local banks as it is normally very difficult for 
them to borrow money from their counterparts in the money market. This is 
because, on average, banks do not have a large asset size. 
With the introduction of HK$ Certificate of Deposits that can be 
discounted in the Liquidity Adjustment Facility established by the HKMA, 
banks can now buy this kind of CD at HIBOR plus interest income. This option 
also offers flexibility for banks to obtain overnight deposits from HKMA. In 
addition, banks can also buy foreign currency bonds, especially US dollar，to 
improve yield spread without actually affecting their liquidity ratio. 
Securitise Loan Portfolio 
In most cases, loans maturity does not match with deposits maturity as 
loans are usually of a longer term commitment. Hence, bank may face a 
difficulty of financing these loans. To improve the situation, banks can 
consider the option of securitising the loan portfolio, mainly mortgage loans 
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and credit card receivables, with a view to reducing credit risk and boosting 
both profitability as well as liquidity. 
To securitise their loan portfolio, banks will transfer selected loan assets 
to a trust company and arrange repayment received on these loans 
periodically to pay investors of these asset backed securities. In return, part of 
the loan portfolio will be converted into cash items on the bank's balance sheet 
and can be used to finance more loans to bring in more income. In this way, 
local banks may be able to diversify credit risk and boost profitability, 
especially from the trust company, while still maintaining a desired level of 
liquidity. 
Sharpen Competitive Edge 
High yield deposits should be introduced to attract professional clients 
so as to improve banks' competitive edge. In recent years, there has been more 
and more enquiries from bank clients who would not mind taking higher risk 
derivatives with a view to getting higher yields for their investments. 
For instance, if the Australian dollar (A$) floats within the range from 
0.72 to 0.77 in the coming 6 months, these investors will get interest at a 
deposit rate of 16% p.a. for the period concerned. On the other hand, they 
may get 0% if A$ touches the border. To reduce the risk, banks can either 
arrange for corresponding options hedge or swap agreement with other 
investment bank. As a result�banks can retain depositors who are willing to 
take certain risks and promote a lower costs of deposits. 
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Issuance of Bonds or NCDs 
While there are methods to increase the asset size of banks, there are 
also ways for boosting the liability size on the balance sheet. Issuance of bonds 
or negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs) are some examples. These 
activities can help boost liquidity of banks. 
In general, banks can narrow the funding gap either through 
participating in the interbank market or issuing NCDs and bonds. The amount 
drawn from issuing these certificates can provide funding to support loan 
growth. In other words�banks' profitability position can be improved. 
Table 6: Bank's fund raising activity in 1994 
、 Issue Date Expiry Date Amount In 
Issue 
Hang Seng Bank 5/7/94 1/7/96 $2.10 bn 
Shanghai Commercial Bank 3/3/94 1/3/96 $0.60 bn 
HK Chinese Bank 1/2/94 1/2/97 $0.60 bn 
Wing Hang Bank 10/7/94 10/7/97 $0.54 bn 
Commercial Bank of Hong Kong 1/7/94 30/6/97 $0.50 bn 
Chekiang First Bank 10/3/94 10/3/99 $0.40 bn 
Union Bank 1/7/94 1/7/98 $0.30 bn 
Source: Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 1994 
Furthermore, banks are also required by the HKMA to diversify their 
funding sources (Table 6). Hence, issuing fixed and floating NCDs has become 
a popular method to solve the liquidity problem. However, this method can be 
very expensive. Normally, NCDs will have interest-rate margins of 40-50 
basis points over either HIBOR or London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR). 
t, 
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Therefore, issuing NCDs can only be a short-term strategy; it cannot be a long-
term solution to raising bank capital. 
Issuance of Share Capital 
A longer term strategy to solve the liquidity problem is by issuing share 
capital. However, this is not an easy strategy to implement. There are lots of 
considerations that banks should take into account before action. For instance， 
it may not be the right timing now as the P/E ratio for the stock market is 
currently on its low side. In addition, market reaction may not be positive as 
the current market movement is not encouraging at all. In other words, right 
timing is one of the crucial factors to consider for issuance of share capital and 
has to be carefully identified. 
Shifting to Non-interest Income 
Traditionally, profits of banks depends heavily on net interest incomes. 
However, as Hong Kong Dollar deposit rates remained at low levels over the 
last three years, the growth in Hong Kong Dollar deposits was slow when 
compared with the growth of loans volume (Chart 4). As discussed in Chapter 
II，a decline in time deposits' growth limited the supply of longer-term bank 
funds, and hence, affected loan growth. This has widened local banks' 
maturity mismatch and restricted the pace of loan extensions. This restricts 
banks' earning capacity by the traditional technique. 
While local banks suffered from a setback in interest earnings due to 
various reasons, opportunities to develop non-interest income activities can be 
increased to improve bank earnings for the next few years. Although non-
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interest income only accounts for less than 30% of total income, it has a high 
growth rate compared with net interest receipts. Growth in non-interest 
income soared from 11.6% in 1991 to 23.0% in 1993, while growth in net 
interest receipts suffered a declining trend over the same period. 
There is definitely a potential for banks to further develop this income 
source. Economic reform in China stimulating a high demand for loans and a 
high turnover in the stock market�all provide good opportunities for local 
banks to diversify more resources to develop non-interest income. 
Exploring Opportunities for Fee Income 
Subsequent to China's foreign trade decentralisation and adoption of a 
socialist market economy, two-way trade flows between Hong Kong and China 
recorded rapid growth (Chart 10). Re-exports between Hong Kong and China 
have grown by nearly 40% since 1990. Moreover, about 88% of the goods re-
exported through Hong Kong are destined for, or originated from, China. This 
provides excellent opportunities for developing fee income activities resulting 
from issuing, advising and confirming letters of credit, as well as collecting 
payment for exporters. 
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Chart 10: External Trade 
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Arranging and Managing Syndicated Loans 
In addition, banks are engaging more in the arrangement and 
management of syndicated loans. Given the rapid progress in outward 
processing activities and major domestic infrastructural projects, syndicated 
loans arranged in Hong Kong surged to a total of HK$ 92.11 billion in 1993, 
compared with HK$ 40.60 billion in 1991. The leap helped increase the 
income derived from the management, participation and agency fees earned 
by banks. 
More Focused on Consumer Banking 
On the retail front, extensive development of credit business has 
provided an alternative source of fee income for banks. In 1993, Mastercard's 
circulation in Hong Kong, for instance�has increased by 42.8% to over 
850,000 cardholders, some one-third of the Visa cards in circulation. 
Transaction volume for Mastercard grew by 27.8% over the same period. The 
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substantial rise in new issues and transaction volume helped lift the total 
amount of annual fees and agency commission received by banks. 
Furthermore, there is a clear trend of more premium personal banking 
services being offered to the top end of the consumer market. This will also 
help to expand the income base for banks as premium services can be charged. 
Underwriting and Consultancy Services 
Although the stock market has been quite volatile, high turnover in the 
Hong Kong market helps local banks to focus on underwriting and 
consultancy activities. The massive influx of foreign mutual funds has satiated 
the stock market, creating a bullish atmosphere over period from 1992-1993. 
Average daily turnover rose by more than two-fold to HK$ 4.91 billion in 
1993. This, coupled with the listing of Chinese state-owned enterprises on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and the surge in share flotation exercises, 
promoted the underwriting and brokerage services of banks. In addition, as 
management consultancy and trustee services have mushroomed in recent 
years, they will also contribute to the improvement of the banks' portfolio of 
non-interest income business. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The US Federal Reserve has recently raised US interest rates a few times 
towards the latter half of 1994 due to a strong growth in the US economy. 
This is in fact an attempt to stern inflationary pressure. Consequently, Hong 
Kong interest rates had to follow the same movement due to the peg rate 
arrangement. This caused interest margins to decline when compared to the 
beginning of 1994. The average spread between the best lending rate and the 
three-month HIBOR has crawled downward to around 2.6%, and that between 
the best lending rate and the savings rate remained at 4.75%. The decrease in 
interest margins will continue to moderate the interest income of banks. 
Although the property market remained fairly stable and property 
prices have dropped by 10 to 20% since April 1994，government measures to 
curb the growth and tight supervision by the HKMA to limit banks' exposure 
to property mortgage loan risk have hindered the growth of mortgage lending. 
In addition�competition from property developers, who offer compensation 
packages, such as 80 to 85% mortgage ceiling, and delayed payment 
schedules�will also affect the demand for mortgage loans from local banks. 
On the corporate front, the rapid development of the local capital 
market is quickening the pace of financial disintermediation. At the moment, 
some foreign banks and large corporations have launched floating rate notes 
(FRNs) and mortgage-backed securities to enrich their liquidity. In other 
words, the significance of commercial banks as financial intermediation has 
declined. 
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Since the Hong Kong government has accepted the recommendations of 
the Consumer Council to remove the interest cap on time deposits in 1995，the 
net interest income for banks will further decline. This forces local banks to 
concentrate more on developing non-interest business to balance their earning 
capabilities in the future. 
Without a doubt，the performance of non-interest income activities is 
highly affected by external factors. However, strong economic recovery in 
industrialised economies, the renewal of China's Most-Favoured-Nation 
(MFN) status, the anticipated soft-landing of the Chinese economy, and the 
near settlement of financial arrangements for Hong Kong's new airport, will 
help bolster the growth of these non-interest activities. 
In a nutshell, with the declining return on bank lending and the 
adoption of various fee-income activities, banks in Hong Kong are on the same 
track as their global counterparts and will spend tremendous efforts to develop 
non-interest income sources in the foreseeable future. Under the current 
circumstances, the role of non-interest income in Hong Kong's banking 
A 
industry will become more important and more prominent than ever before. 
This will not only keep banks' profitability, but will also help reduce their 
operating risks and improve their position in the face of keen competition 
ahead as Hong Kong become more internationalised. ‘ 
c 
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